Showing posts with label lucio tan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lucio tan. Show all posts

20121020

Anti-Money Laundering Law: TAX EVADERS, OTHER OFFENDERS OFF THE HOOK FOR NOW by Sheila Samonte-Pescayo, PCIJ

PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM

 3-4 OCTOBER 2001
  by SHEILA SAMONTE-PESAYCO

Our two-part story examines the debates on the recently approved anti-money laundering law and shows that Congress has little to crow about when it passed the landmark law and beat the September 30 deadline imposed by the powerful, Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Rather, the law protects vested interests, including those of Congress members themselves. As pointed out in this report, the law approved over the weekend, was debated largely in secret. The law was being debated less than a year after the Estrada impeachment trial and amid allegations that Senator Panfilo Lacson hid proceeds from drugs and other illegal activities in secret overseas accounts. But as this report says, rather than providing the impetus to enact a tough law that would curb money laundering, these twin events created a “chilling effect” on lawmakers, who wanted to make sure that the law they draft today would not be used against them tomorrow.
DESPITE dire predictions, Congress passed last week a landmark anti-money laundering law, beating the deadline set by a powerful international body, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). But unlike others who welcomed the passage of the new measure, Sen. Sergio 'Serge' Osmeña, one of the law's original sponsors, is not in a celebratory mood.
"There are hidden agendas here," he said. "We had a marvelous opportunity to collect P100 billion more in taxes but now we have a situation where we're signaling we are even condoning tax evasion."
Tax evasion was not counted as one of the 14 crimes covered by the anti-money laundering law, which provides sanctions for those who use banks to keep proceeds from the following unlawful activities: kidnap for ransom, drug trafficking, graft and corruption, plunder, robbery and extortion, jueteng and masiao, piracy on high seas, qualified theft or white-collar crimes, swindling, smuggling, electronic fraud, hijacking, destructive arson and murder, securities fraud and felony.
This omission was not surprising. After all, even the government version of the bill submitted to Congress did not include tax evasion. This was because of the objections raised in a meeting between government representatives and the influential Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industries.
The group, which until recently was identified with tobacco tycoon Lucio Tan, thumbed down the inclusion of tax evasion in the list of predicate offenses for fear the law would be used to harass them. The Ramos government had slapped a P26-billion tax evasion case against Tan.
Moreover, at the Sept. 11 joint hearing of three House committees, Dante Go, president of the Chinese-Filipino Business Club, endorsed the anti-money laundering bill but only if tax evasion as an offense were to be removed. During the hearing, several congressmen assured Go that his sentiments would be considered.
To be fair, there is some basis for the businessmen's fears. After all, over the years, corrupt revenue officials have used their discretionary powers to extort money from businessmen they accuse of tax evasion. But at the same time, the exclusion of this offense from the anti-money laundering law deprives the government of the additional powers it needs to clamp down on tax evasion and other crimes.
Thus, Ernest Leung, former chairman of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp., says the drafting of the law was a "pathetic waste of time and scarce resources to have labored on such a useless Act." He said the measure was passed merely to comply with a deadline, but many government officials themselves had been reluctant to pass an honest piece of legislation. The result, Leung said, is a law that represents "subservience to vested interests."
That may be true, but a review of the process that led to the passage of the law shows that legislators often behaved in unexpected ways and were motivated not solely by self-interest but by a number of other, sometimes incomprehensible, motives. Moreover, the executive department, including Malacañang, did not fight for the anti-money laundering law with as much conviction as it did for the power reform bill.
Ironically, it was Manila Rep. Mark Jimenez, an ally of former president Joseph Estrada who is facing charges of illegal campaign donations and tax evasion in the US, who lobbied for the inclusion of tax evasion in the law.
According to transcripts of the Sept. 12 House committee hearing, Jimenez said this was needed so the country could generate more revenues. He even produced a copy of the provisions of the US anti-racketeering law that listed violations of the Internal Revenue Code as the number one unlawful activity.
Jimenez said he feared that legislators might be "ridiculed" if they pass a law not recognizing tax evasion as a punishable crime because "we are cooperating with the (Chinese) businessmen".
Jimenez's arguments did not sit well with Makati Rep. Teodoro Locsin Jr., who said including tax evasion will make the committee renege on the "assurance" it gave to the Chinese-Filipino businessmen who had attended the previous hearing.
"I don't want to go on record as a defender of tax evaders… I just feel my sense of fair play is violated… When they (Chinese businessmen) were here, we can't think of an argument for including (tax evasion) so we excluded it… they left with that assurance," Locsin said.
Jimenez, however, won over Manila Rep. Jaime Lopez who said he would talk to the Chinese- Filipino business groups to explain the inclusion of tax evasion. In the end, however, the House approved a version of the bill that left out tax evasion from the four unlawful activities it recognized. The Senate-approved bill was also silent on the matter.
Another provision that drew a lot of debates was on the agencies that will have jurisdiction over the anti-money laundering council (AMLC) that will implement the law. The inter-agency version of the bill included eight agencies - the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Cooperative Development Authority, Department of Tourism, the Philippine Gaming and Amusement Corp. (Pagcor), and the Insurance Commission. This was meant to cast a wider net in tracking down the proceeds from illegal activities.
The eight "supervisory authorities" in both the House and Senate versions of the bill, however, were trimmed down to only three: the BSP, SEC and the Insurance Commission. Committee sources said there was a strong lobby not to include housing and real estate developers, cooperatives, casinos, and travel agencies from the list of entities that will be reached by the arm of the law.
House economic affairs committee chairman, Rep. Oscar Moreno admitted the authorities will not be able to trace whether the proceeds from a crime had been funneled to buy real estate, for instance, because of the limitations of the law. The only consolation, he said is that "unlike cash, which is liquid, you cannot sell land right away" to escape authorities.
The Senate initially approved a "working draft" that placed the AMLC solely under the authority of the BSP. This was despite some lawmakers' claims that they did not want to give the central bank "too much powers."
BSP Governor Rafael Buenaventura, however, lobbied against this and convinced Senate leaders to instead include the SEC commissioner and the Insurance Commission head in the three-man task force overseeing the AMLC. Aside from anticipating the load of work, Buenaventura said the BSP only has jurisdiction over banks and financial institutions. It could not supervise entities outside of the banking system.
Sen. Joker Arroyo of Makati criticized the BSP for "overloading the draft bill with unnecessary provisions that are very controversial." He cited the "enormous quasi-judicial powers" vested in the proposed AMLC which may be challenged as "unconstitutional".
"How can a bank make a determination of whether the money is clean or not? A bank is a mere depository, not a judge… We are making the Council very powerful by giving it an authority to freeze the account," he argued.
Arroyo's position on the anti-money laundering bill surprised some government officials. The former Makati congressman was a prosecutor in Estrada's botched impeachment trial yet he was also pushing for provisions that would make the anti-money laundering law almost toothless. These included the right of the suspected money launderer to sue the AMLC "to seek redress," and shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff (the government unit filing the anti-money laundering case) from the accused.
During the floor deliberations on Sept. 27, Arroyo also pushed for the adoption of the House version on obtaining a court order to peek into bank deposits, even if, as a prosecutor in Estrada's impeachment, he was railing against banks disobeying the order from the impeachment court to pry open the former president's bank accounts.
To Arroyo, the problem was the BSP. "In the impeachment trial, he (BSP governor) didn't cooperate with us… They didn't help us one bit. We discovered all (the accounts) on our own. This shows the BSP is not immune to political pressure… That's why this bill is dangerous. Gloria might utilize it to go after the opposition," he said in an interview.
He also said his "prejudice" against the BSP is "institutional, not against the governors." He said he will oppose any move to give the BSP more teeth than it currently has because "I just cannot trust them as truly independent."
While the law only gave the AMLC the authority to freeze the suspicious account for 15 days, there were attempts to erode this power even further. Sen. Panfilo Lacson, who himself is being linked by intelligence chief Victor Corpus to money laundering, proposed an amendment that would give the owner of the suspicious account three days to explain before the deposits could be frozen. Sen. Edgardo Angara endorsed the amendment for style because it was "concise."
When Senate President Franklin Drilon banged the gavel approving the Lacson amendment, BSP Governor Buenaventura and Finance Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho, who were seated at the Senate gallery watching the proceedings, suddenly sprang from their seats and talked to Osmeña. Convinced that the amendment will erode the powers of the AMLC and enable the suspected money launderer to buy time to conceal the money, Osmeña rose to the floor and sought for a reconsideration of the Senate move.
In the final version that was ratified, the suspected money launderer has 72 hours or three days to explain why the freeze order should be lifted. The depositor would be notified that his account has been frozen "simultaneously" with the release of the freeze order. While the provision relaxes the bank secrecy rule, it added a bureaucratic layer that would delay the opening of suspicious deposits.
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. also proposed to lessen the penalty and jail terms for convicted money launderers. He said the imprisonment term of seven to 14 years under the proposed bill is "a draconian approach" and should be shortened to one to five years. The senator, however, failed to push strongly for the move.
Congress made sure it will exert influence over the anti-money laundering body by inserting a provision giving itself oversight powers on the drafting of the implementing rules and regulations of the law.
The truth is that, were it not for the threats from the FATF, Philippine officials would not have mustered the political will to pass an anti-money laundering law. Three administrations - under former presidents Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada - failed to fulfill the country's international commitment to criminalize and combat money laundering.
Thus, on March 12, 2000, the US State Department issued a scathing report citing the Philippines as one of six Asian countries being used as money laundering centers. The report rated the Philippines "a concern," with because of rising crime, pervasive corruption and the absence of anti-money laundering laws.
The report came just three months ahead of the FATF announcement listing the Philippines among 15 countries and territories not doing enough to fend off the flow of dirty money. Then in early August 2000, the US abstained from voting for the approval of a $1.4-billion International Monetary Fund facility for the Philippines. The US, which entered the lone abstention, reportedly raised doubts the Estrada administration was sincere and serious in curbing money laundering.
At a luncheon at the White House the same month, then US President Bill Clinton also followed up on the Philippines' international commitment from then President Estrada who was there on a state visit. A Philippine senator who was in the meeting said Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers also pressed Buenaventura and then Finance Secretary Jose Pardo, "and gave them a mouthful."
Despite the opposition, the bill relaxing the deposit secrecy law was miraculously approved on second reading at the Lower House on December 7, 2000. This was amid raging controversy during the impeachment trial on Estrada, linking banks used as depositories of the president's alleged illegal funds. Barely a week later, however, the Lower House suddenly recalled the bill due to a technicality. "Clean copies" of the bill were not distributed before its approval, reportedly a violation of the House rules.
The measure thus went back to second reading and never saw the light of day. Dust started to accumulate when Congress had a Christmas break last year, and thickened when Estrada was ousted.
In April, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration called for a special session of Congress to pass one of the two pending bills: the power reform bill. A top government official who attended the first Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council said: "The President pushed for the one that is less controversial and has more likelihood of getting approved." Pushing for the deposit secrecy bill would be a costly political exercise given the many vested interests involved, the source said.
The President reportedly said she would include the anti-money laundering bill in her list of legislative priorities to be announced at her State of the Nation Address, but she did not. On August 29, 2001, the joint Senate committee on banks and financial institutions, and justice and human rights held its first hearing on four anti-money laundering bills - not one of which came from Malacañang.  Government officials present at the hearing said the draft legislation had just been endorsed by DoJ to the Palace when banks committee chairman Ramon Magsaysay, Jr. asked which one is the government version. The draft bill had not been certified urgent and had not yet found a sponsor only a month before the FATF deadline.
Sources said it was only when Bangko Sentral Governor Rafael Buenaventura and Finance Secretary Jose Camacho came home empty-handed from a trip to Paris that the President realized the FATF was not bluffing when it threatened to impose sanctions on the Philippines by end-September if an anti-money laundering law is not yet in place. There was no choice now but to rush the bill through Congress.
"We were rushed certainly," said Drilon. "There was no specific notice to us about the warnings of the FATF." Last April, when the government was lobbying for the power reform bill, an administration-party senator said Arroyo "would call up three, four times" a day to speed up passage of the bill. In the case of the anti-money laundering bill, however, he said "there was no such urgency."
Government sources said Malacañang actually had a dilemma in deciding whether to certify the bill or not. Given the number of solons who filed their own versions of the anti-money laundering bill, the sources said the president did not want to "endorse just one and offend the others."
"In the end, it was a political decision," said another official who declined to be named.


Copyright © 2001 All rights reserved.
PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM



20100912

Is the Open-Skies Policy the Answer to Lucio Tan’s Anti-Worker Schemes? - Bulatlat

ANTI-FILIPINO GOVERNMENT


The Aquino Government is just a continuation of governments in the Philippines which the north americans invaders of our nation in 1898, have cultured to become puppets of them, the foreign invaders which included the chinese who are not in conflict with their interests and a neutralizer of filipino economic independence. Lucio Tan is one of those chinese invaders. He is the product of that objective for that culture by the north americans.

France has a very high level of protectionism towards its vital industries.  This is a good model for a start.  In order for us filipinos to be protected in reality, one option is the take over of PAL from Lucio Tan who is not a filipino in reality and have it managed by a team from the government and the private sector.  This is just at the theoretical level which needs thorough study and much fundamental behavioral reconstruction at the social level, in reality if it has to reach the viability stage.

José Miguel García


Part of the article written by Marya Salamat of Bulatlat.com which can be read wholly by clicking on the title above says:                       "In the short-term, this may close the gap in air transport service that a strike in the Philippine flag carrier would create, but at the expense of sabotaging the demands of Filipino workers."

20100428

BusinessWorld Online: Anatomy of a crony takeover (Conclusion)

Opinion
Posted on 09:59 PM, April 07, 2010

Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod

Anatomy of a crony takeover

Conclusion
The documents that I have thus far shared with the reader were sent to me by Catalino Generillo, who, while he was the PCGG lawyer in charge of Civil Case 0005 against Lucio Tan, et al., also presented it to the Sandiganbayan. They consist of letters from Lucio Tan to President Marcos and from PNB President P.O. Domingo to the Central Bank, an internal memorandum to Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros signed by his top aides, and the minutes of the Central Bank Monetary Board meeting wherein the board essentially waived its own rules to protect the PNB and to further financially accommodate Lucio Tan.
For his efforts on behalf of the Filipino people, Generillo was unceremeniously kicked out of the PCGG at the behest of Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera upon the complaint of Lucio Tan’s counsel, Estelito Mendoza. The reader, after reading these documents, can come to only one conclusion: that Lucio Tan could never have acquired what is now Allied Bank in 1977 without the help and active intervention of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and then Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros. The documents are uncontrovertible proof that Tan was given advance information, that PNB stuck out its financial neck for him (obviously on orders of Marcos), that the CB violated its own rules and regulations when it allowed him to win the bid for GenBank, that the technocrats at the CB had taken the unusual step of officially writing to their boss reminding him of all these violations.
Now comes the final question: Why was Tan so "malakas" with Marcos? The answer is revealed by the last document I present to the reader: excerpts from the sworn statement of Rolando C. Gapud, signed in Hong Kong "with the advice and assistance of" his lawyer, Angel C. Cruz, and in the presence of then PCGG Chair Jovito Salonga and Salvador C. Hizon, also of PCGG. The document speaks for itself (the few comments I have are italicized and bracketed).
"Sworn Statement
"I, Rolando C. Gapud, a Filipino citizen, of legal age, hereby depose and state under oath:
".......I was appointed VP of Bancom Development Corporation and rose to become Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer....I provided financial consultancy services to our clients. Among such clients was Mr. Jose Yao Campos of United Laboratories.....I was introduced by Mr. Jose Yao Campos to Mr. Marcos in or around 1973-1974...I was asked by Mr. Marcos to audit companies under the supervision and ownership of the following persons: Pablo Roman...Roberto Sabido...Frankie Teodorol...Luis Yulo...Trinidad Enriquez... I recall that I submitted to PCGG a brief description of the businesses of business associates and relatives of Mr Marcos -- including the following: (ANNEX "A") [Annex A consists of 25 pages describing the businesses of 29 such associates, popularly known as "cronies"] " ...I was the one who prepared and typed ANNEX "A". I submitted it...before I left the Philippines through the back-door in or around June 1986, because of what I perceived to be some great danger to my life...
"... 7. In 1980, I bcame the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). At that time, I was the Financial Executor of Mr. and Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos. It is not quite accurate to say that I was the financial advisor of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos. Although at times I was consulted by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos and in that sense acted as financial advisor, in truth I was often carrying out the instrutions of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos. These instructions came to me, either through Mrs. Fe R. Gimenez who used to all up to convey them, or given to me directly by Mr. Ferdinand Marcos or Mrs. Imelda R. Maros, after being asked by Mrs. Gimenez to go to Malacañang.
[Here comes the reference to Lucio Tan:]
"8. With particular reference, for example to MR. LUCIO TAN, I know that Mr. Marcos and Mr. Lucio Tan had an understanding that Mr. Marcos owns 60% of Shareholdings, Inc., which owns shares of Fortune Tobacco, Asia Beer Brewery Allied Bank, and Foremost Farms. I was asked sometime in 1985 to formalize this arrangement. I went to Mr. Lucio Tan for that purpose. He tried to bargain by reducing the equity of Mr. Marcos to 50%. I told him that I was merely carrying out the instructions of Mr. Marcos and that if he wanted to bargain, he should take up the matter directly with Mr. Marcos. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lucio Tan, apart from the 60% equity of Mr. Marcos, had been regularly paying, through Security Bank, Sixty Million Pesos (P60 Million) to One Hundred Million Pesos (P100 million) a year to Mr. Marcos, in exchange for privileges and concessions Mr. Marcos had been giving him in relation to the business managed by Mr. Lucio Tan. As I said on p. 7 of Annex "A", Mr. Lucio Tan gained substantial concessions in specific taxes and stamp duties for his cigarette(Fortune Tobacco) and Beer Operations. He belongs to the group that could get presidential decrees and letters of instruction from Mr. Marcos for their joint benefit. I understand that Mr. Tan asserted that he was the victim of extortion, and that he outwitted Mr. Marcos by issuing to Mr. Marcos his 60% equity in face certificates of stock. This is not accurate. Mr. Marcos and Mr. Tan were in partnership, and they derived great material benefits from their relationship. As far as I know, Mr. Tan was not in a position to outwit and outmaneuver Mr. Marcos. I do not know that there is a crony or business associate of Mr. Marcos who could have done that. [emphasis supplied -scm]
[Can anyone, with the possible exception of the present PCGG and the Sandiganbayan, still doubt that Marcos and Tan were partners, with Tan being very much the junior partner?]
"....As far as I can remember there was only one instance of what I can describe as a legitimate earning of Mr. Marcos, namely, the retirement benefits of Mr. Marcos coming from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), but this was very small -- around One hundred thousand pesos)...which was given to him, through the Security Bank, when he reached the age of 65.
"...Also Security Bank used to receive wire transfers from many sources abroad, involving enormous sums of money, which were credited to the trust accounts and savings accounts of Mr. Marcos.
[Gapud also relates that Marcos acquired controlling interest of at least 51% in Security Bank, and proceeded to open several dollar and peso trust accounts (most starting with 77) and savings accounts , together with fascinating details about how boxes containing cash were regular sources of savings account deposits. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to conclude that all the money in trust and savings accounts were ill-gotten or unexplained: Gapud himself says that the only legitimate earning of Mr. Marcos was his retirement pay from GSIS.]
"...I am prepared to elaborate, if necessary, and execute such document or documents as may be needed to explain such part or parts of this Sworn Statemnt which may require clarification."
Thus does Gapud end his eight-page sworn statement (not including two annexes). He was ready to cooperate with the Philippine government in its efforts to claim the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, wealth stolen from the Filipino people, including his share of the Tan-managed companies.
And yet, the PCGG has never used Gapud’s testimony, nor even called him to testify. In the same way that it has refused to use Tan’s brother Mariano Tanenglian as a witness for the prosecution. And the Sandiganbyan seems to be cooperating. They are that willing to kiss P220 billion (a conservative estimate of 60% of the value of the Tan empire) goodbye. The country is being suffocated by corruption. Is there a remedy? Yes. We can elect a president who will lead the fight against corruption rather than one who will allow it to flourish. This may not be a sufficient condition for success -- but it is a necessary one. The choice is ours.
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